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‘Cleanse or Die’: British Naval Hygiene in the Age of
Steam, 1840–1900
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Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Abstract: This article focuses on the consolidation of naval hygiene
practices during the Victorian era, a period of profound medical change
that coincided with the fleet’s transition from sail to steam. The ironclads
of the mid- to late- nineteenth century offered ample opportunities to
improve preventive medicine at sea, and surgeons capitalised on new
steam technologies to provide cleaner, dryer, and airier surroundings
below decks. Such efforts reflected the sanitarian idealism of naval
medicine in this period, inherited from the eighteenth-century pioneers
of the discipline. Yet, despite the scientific thrust of Victorian naval
medicine, with its emphasis on collecting measurements and collating
statistics, consensus about the causes of disease eluded practitioners. It
proved almost impossible to eradicate sickness at sea, and the enclosed
nature of naval vessels showed the limitations – rather than the promise
– of attempting to enforce absolute environmental controls. Nonetheless,
sanitarian ideology prevailed throughout the steam age, and the hygienic
reforms enacted throughout the fleet showed some of the same successes
that attended the public health movement on land. It was thus despite
shifting ideas about disease and new methods of investigation that naval
medicine remained wedded to its sanitarian roots until the close of the
nineteenth century.
Keywords: Royal Navy, Naval medicine, Hygiene, Sanitation,
Ventilation, Etiology
In the nineteenth century, the Royal Navy enjoyed a particular reputation for cleanliness.
For officers and sailors, the continuous washing and fumigating of the decks may have
been a ritual of order and discipline, but for the surgeons serving with them, it was upheld
as a life-saving exigency. When the surgeon Norman Chevers half-jokingly suggested in
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1846 that the Navy’s motto ought to be ‘cleanse or die!’, his views reflected the widespread
belief amongst medical men that sanitary precautions were the key to preserving health
afloat.1
From the late eighteenth century onwards, the challenges of instituting the principles of
preventive medicine at sea revolved around maintaining a clean, dry, and well-ventilated
environment within spaces that were invariably overcrowded, damp, and enclosed. The
notorious insalubrity of ships remained axiomatic until the manpower requirements of
warfare spurred efforts to minimise disease casualties. In Britain, the recommendations of
maritime health authorities such as James Lind (1716–94), Thomas Trotter (1760–1832),
and Gilbert Blane (1749–1834) led the Admiralty to institute reforms in every area of naval
hygiene: sanitation and ventilation; dietary and drink allowances; clothing and bedding;
exercise and rest.2 The benefits conferred by prioritising sanitary and dietary concerns
were particularly shown during James Cook’s exploratory voyages of the 1770s, which
boasted such low levels of mortality and morbidity that the value of preventive medicine
was established beyond all doubt.
Yet, if naval hygiene was pioneered under sail, its precepts were most fully realised
in the age of steam. As this article shows, technological advances in the nineteenth
century vastly improved the potential for preventive medicine afloat. However, they also
presented health problems of their own, challenging surgeons to overcome such hygienic
hazards as the heat of the boilers, the damp of condensation on metal sidings, and the
limited airflow to lower compartments. Innovative strategies for preserving the health of
seafarers were constantly suggested and trialled, even while the rationales underpinning
such measures were subjected to increased scrutiny – both from practical experience
and from new etiological models that challenged the traditional link between sickness
and the environment. Although Victorian naval surgeons believed that their ships might
become fortresses against disease, their efforts to prevent epidemics often failed. This
schism between theory and experience resulted in a conflicted system of medical practice
in which preventive models continued to hold sway, even while their limitations were
acknowledged.
While the emphasis placed on hygiene may not have entirely eradicated sickness, the
Admiralty certainly used the conversion to steam to improve sanitary conditions. Their
efforts raised levels of health and comfort in the service, and ultimately produced a
decline in casualties during the second half of the nineteenth century.3 In this respect, the
naval example anticipated advances made in the civilian sphere, where sanitary measures
succeeded in raising the standard of living and limiting the spread of diseases whose
origin remained a subject of debate.4 Yet, the parallels are not exact. While naval medical
authorities claimed that hygienic principles were interchangeable whether on land or sea,
the struggles of health authorities to institute preventive measures in the public sphere
1 Norman Chevers, On the Preservation of the Health of Seamen (Calcutta: Military Orphans Press, 1864), 18.
2 James Lind, An Essay on the Most Effectual Means of Preserving the Health of Seamen in the Royal Navy
(London: 1757); Gilbert Blane, Observations on the Diseases Incident to Seamen (London: Joseph Cooper,
1785); Thomas Trotter, Medicina Nautica (London: T. Cadell and W Davies, 1797).
3 Vaughan Myles Dutton, Mortality Decline in the Royal Navy, 1850–99 (unpublished DPhil thesis: University of
Oxford, 2009). Dutton argues that the decline in naval mortality and morbidity rates were due to dietary changes
and sanitary measures.
4 Anthony S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain (London: Methuen, 1983); Christopher
Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998); and F.B. Smith, The People’s Health, 1830–1910 (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
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were not shared. Naval surgeons did not have to wrestle with officialdom for permission
to implement their preventive strategies, nor did they have to contend with uncooperative
citizens.5 Instead, the Navy’s command structure permitted them to enact their hygienic
recommendations, and gave them nearly absolute control over the environment in which
they served. It is precisely the self-contained nature of naval vessels that make them a
critical model for considering how medical theory interacted with practical observations
in a period of rapid technological change.
As recent scholarship has emphasised, nineteenth-century military medicine reflected
the modernisation of warfare more broadly, as the principles of scientific management
allowed for greater efficiency in the health provisions of armies and navies.6 Hygiene
dominated this strategy: an ounce of prevention was worth several pounds of cure at a
time when the therapeutic arsenal was comparatively limited. For Gilbert Blane, ships’
officers could far better ensure the health of crews through precautionary measures than
surgeons could using the ‘falliable’ art of physic.7 As Katherine Foxhall and Tim Carter
have shown for immigrant and merchant vessels, this ideal did not necessarily adapt to
the management of shipboard health in the commercial sector, where skimming costs was
often prioritised over seafarers’ welfare.8 But it was a necessity for the Royal Navy, whose
manpower needs justified the expenses incurred in preserving lives.
In Admiralty instructions issued throughout the nineteenth century, surgeons were
repeatedly reminded that ‘dryness, cleanliness, and ventilation’ were the preferred means
of preventing and destroying the causes of disease.9 The wording of these instructions
supported environmental theories of disease, which posited that noxious emanations
from decomposing animal or vegetable matter were responsible for the propagation
of infectious illnesses.10 These widely held views inspired sanitary reforms, although
the competing contagionist model always had adherents arguing for the role of human
contact in spreading sickness. Naval surgeons tended to favour the sanitarian position,
although successive heads of the Medical Service sought to reframe this debate by
rationalising the basis of maritime medicine. In extensive statistical reports compiled
annually by the Admiralty, attempts were made to systematise all naval knowledge
knowledge about disease.11 Surgeons were required to keep journals detailing every illness
they encountered, and their findings were disseminated in annual health reports. Surgeons
also published independent texts on naval hygiene, filling them with polemical advice
5 As David McLean has shown, naval authorities sometimes faced opposition on land, as during the 1848–9
Plymouth cholera outbreak. David McLean, Public Health and Politics in the Age of Reform: Cholera, the State
and the Royal Navy in Victorian Britain (London: Taurus, 2006).
6 Mark Harrison, ‘Medicine and the Management of Modern Warfare’, History of Science, 34 (1996), 379–410;
Roger Cooter and Steve Sturdy, ‘Of War, medicine and modernity’, in Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison and Steve
Sturdy (eds), War, Medicine and Modernity (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), 1–21.
7 Gilbert Blane, A Short Account of the Most Effectual Means of Preserving the Health of Seamen (London,
1780), 4.
8 Katherine Foxhall, Health, Medicine and the Sea: Australian Voyages, c. 1815–60 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2012); Tim Carter, Merchant Seamen’s Health, 1860–1960: Medicine, Technology, Shipowners
and the State in Britain (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2014).
9 Admiralty, Regulations and Instructions for the Medical Officers of His Majesty’s Fleet (London: W. Clowes
and Sons, 1825), 13.
10 Michael Brown, ‘From Foetid Air to Filth: The Cultural Transformation of British Epidemiological Thought,
c. 1780–1848’ Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 82 (2008), 515–44; Christopher Hamlin, ‘Providence and
Putrefaction: Victorian Sanitarians and the Natural Theology of Health and Disease’, Victorian Studies, 28
(1985), 381–411.
11 The first statistical report on ‘the Health of the Navy’ was published in 1840, and annual editions appeared
from 1857.
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about how best to preserve health at sea. These sources – by and for medical officers –
reveal that naval medicine enacted broader disagreements in Britain around the origin and
spread of infectious diseases. Because naval surgeons interpreted disease at sea, their ship
‘a little world within itself’, their experiences present a unique perspective on the state of
epidemiological thought in the Victorian era.12 Their writings also show how technological
advances could be used to stretch and test the limits of preventive care. This article thus
examines how the ‘artificial’ living conditions aboard naval steamships inspired health
reforms in the Victorian era, ultimately showing how beholden the sea service was to
prevailing medical orthodoxy.
Preventive Medicine at Sea
If naval medicine in the nineteenth century was characterised by eclecticism, with surgeons
facing a wide variety of ailments depending on the makeup and location of their vessels,
then a belief in hygienic principles united them. Provided the causes of disease could be
correctly identified, a timely implementation of precautionary measures would suffice to
keep sickness at bay. It was well established by the early 1800s that masses of people in
confined areas were particularly prone to ill health, and that shipboard epidemics were
difficult to contain given the limited space and resources available to surgeons. Believing
that counteracting the causes of disease would always ‘surpass in importance the means
curative’, maritime medical texts consequently prioritised prophylaxis.13
The term ‘hygiene’ in this period broadly referred to all measures of preserving health.
Specific preventatives such as quinine for malaria, citrus juices for scurvy, and smallpox
vaccination had shown their value for particular diseases, but environmental management
was heralded as the universal panacea against infection. Spaces that were light, dry,
temperate, and airy were considered the most salubrious, but were almost impossible to
create aboard ship. Nonetheless, the objective of Victorian naval hygiene was to maintain
an ideal environment, and to manage every other factor affecting health: from ‘good air’
to nourishing food, warm clothing, clean water, and regular exercise.14
Although naval hygienists often pointed to the universal principles that guided their
proposals, they also recognised the distinct features of their sphere of practice. In 1879,
Thomas J. Turner, then Medical Director of the American Navy, described the field as one
concerned with ‘individuals of only one sex and of limited ages [. . . ] whose occupation is
pursued under conditions which are [in] almost absolute defiance of all sanitary laws’.15
Both naval and military medicine had developed in response to the manpower needs of
eighteenth-century conflicts, when deaths from disease outnumbered those from wounds.
Armies, like navies, had to deal with diseases exacerbated by crowded living conditions,
such as typhus, in addition to those associated with male vice, particularly venereal
disease.16 Both branches of the military also developed expertise in dealing with ‘diseases
12 Gilbert Blane, A Brief Statement of the Progressive Improvement of the Health of the Royal Navy (London: W.
Nicol, 1830), 28.
13 John Wilson, Outlines of Naval Surgery (Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Steward & Co., 1846), 34.
14 John D. MacDonald, Outlines of Naval Hygiene (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1881), 2.
15 Thomas J. Turner, ‘Hygiene of the naval and merchant marine’, in Albert H. Buck (ed.), A Treatise on Hygiene
and Public Health, Vol. II (London: Sampson Low et al., 1879), 177.
16 The controversial Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860s, which enforced the medical examination of
prostitutes, were specifically designed to curb venereal disease in the military. See Judith R. Walkowitz,
Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
67–148.
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of warm climates’ as they were posted around the world, and had to adapt preventive
practices to local atmospheric conditions.17 Yet, maritime medicine had the added problem
of deficiency diseases such as scurvy, and faced the unique challenge of managing health
in an isolated environment, with limited space and supplies, over long periods.
Within the closed environment of a naval vessel, two causal categories of disease
presented themselves: those relating to the ship, and those to its crew.18 The insides
of vessels were thought to pose the greatest risk when they were crowded, dirty, wet,
and suffused with impure air. Problematic behaviours, on the other hand, included
drunkenness, dirtiness, excessive exposure to the wet and cold, imperfect discipline, and
overexertion. Significantly, the root causes of illness in both categories were seen as
preventable, suggesting the possibility of a perfectly healthy voyage.
The realities of life at sea, however, challenged even the most determined surgeons.
Despite the limitless supply of invigorating sea air, the shared living spaces below deck
– particularly the forecastle occupied by sailors – were overcrowded, easily dirtied, and
difficult to ventilate. Increasingly, the degree to which crews managed to maintain a
clean, dry, and airy atmosphere was correlated to their wellbeing. Empirical observation
convinced eighteenth-century medical reformers that if similar ships were experiencing
different rates of disease in the same area, then the problem must lie somewhere within
the afflicted vessels.19 In this nascent period of naval hygiene, the chief culprit of any
shipboard epidemic was typically identified as noxious air. Miasmatic theory, which linked
disease to environmental impurities, was widely accepted by naval medical authorities.20
In C.F. Vandeburgh’s 1819 Mariner’s Medical Guide, for example, ‘unwholesome
effluvias’ were thought to emanate from spoilt cargo, dirty bilge water, and the general
humidity and filthiness in the sailors’ living quarters, leading to outbreaks of fever.21
However, Vandeburgh also allowed for the possibility of alternate causes, and warned
against direct contact with contaminated people or goods. Particularly in the tropics, where
contagious diseases raged, exposure to the shore was advised against, and sick individuals
were to be immediately isolated and cleaned, their clothes boiled and bedding fumigated.22
The Admiralty made similar recommendations to medical officers in 1825, noting that
those ‘taken ill of Fever, which [the surgeon] suspects to be infectious’ should be washed
in warm water, while their clothes and bedding were boiled and ventilated.23 The emphasis
on cleanliness and airing that was believed to prevent the outbreak of disease was also
considered the best means of checking its spread – whether created internally from foetid
airs or transmitted from person to person, the sanitary strategy remained the same.
17 Pratik Chakrabarti, Medicine and Empire, 1600–1960 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 40–56.
18 T. Spencer Wells, The Scale of Medicines With Which Merchant Vessels Are To Be Furnished, 2nd edn
(London: John Churchill, 1861), 17; William Collingridge, ‘Health in the marine service’, in Thomas Oliver
(ed.), Dangerous Trades: The Historical, Social, and Legal Aspects of Industrial Occupations as Affecting Health
(London: John Murray, 1902), 184; Wilson, op. cit. (note 13), 35.
19 Blane, op. cit. (note 7), 4.
20 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Predisposing Causes and Public Health in Early Nineteenth-Century Medical Thought’,
Social History of Medicine, 5 (1992), 43–70; John V. Pickstone, ‘Dearth, dirt, and fever epidemics: rewriting
the history of British public health, 1780–1850’, in Terrance Ranger and Paul Slack (eds), Epidemics and Ideas:
Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125–48.
21 C.F. Vandeburgh, The Mariner’s Medical Guide (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1819), 26–37.
22 Ibid., 39–40.
23 Admiralty, op. cit. (note 9), 13.
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The early nineteenth century was a period of consolidation in naval medicine, as
the recommendations of reformers such as Lind and Blane were implemented.24 The
ventilation and cleansing of ships was regulated, and personal sanitation was improved
by instituting regular washing days and distributing soap. Yet, such practical measures
were accompanied by comparatively little theoretical innovation, and eighteenth-century
medical texts remained authoritative so long as wind propelled sail. Nonetheless, there was
a popular conception in the Victorian era that these opening decades of the century were
generally less than healthy. In such accounts, the efforts of medical reformers in curbing
the incidence of scurvy and improving provisions merited praise, but with the proviso that
sanitary practices made few inroads, with outbreaks of disease ‘justly considered [. . . ] as
excessive’.25 By contrast, Blane’s study of naval medical records between the 1780s and
1820s showed that the number of invalidated men fell by almost two-thirds during this
period; a decrease he mainly attributed to the elimination of scurvy and the use of soap,
which helped to abolish febrile poisons.26 Such estimates aside, the actual impact of such
efforts is unclear, as comparative morbidity rates were not routinely tallied until the late
1830s.
The administrator who instituted the collection of medical statistics, William Burnett
(1779–1861), took charge of the Navy’s Medical Service in 1838.27 His earlier experiences
as inspector of hospitals to the Mediterranean Fleet had prompted a publication in 1814
describing that station’s outbreaks of ‘bilious remittent fever’.28 Burnett strove to explain
diseases based on ‘inferences drawn from nature and truth’ rather than supposition,
and robustly defended the prevailing opinion that marsh miasma caused the fever. His
second edition explicitly rejected the contagiousness of the fever, but conjectured that the
atmosphere around the sick might become vitiated in an unclean ship, ‘and contagion
ensue’.29 If this form of contingent contagionism had never been observed in practice,
it was owing to the Royal Navy’s new commitment to sanitation and discipline. By this
time the observance of hygienic practices such as deck-washing was a point of pride, with
favourable comparisons being made to the ‘putrid’ state of continental vessels.30
The meticulousness with which Burnett studied the Mediterranean fever informed his
prevailing approach to naval medicine. While Blane had mandated that surgeons keep
patient records, Burnett compiled them into an annual statistical survey of the entire
health of the Navy. Information from surgeons’ journals was drawn into tables to reveal
sickness and death rates for every station, and across the entire service. Accounts of
disease outbreaks were also requested, and surgeons were instructed ‘to trace them to
their source [. . . ] and explain the means used for destroying the infection’.31 Like Burnett,
24 R.S. Allison, Sea Diseases: The Story of a Great Natural Experiment in Preventive Medicine in the Royal
Navy (London: John Bale, 1943), 189–90.
25 Gavin Milroy, The Health of the Royal Navy Considered (London: Robert Hardwicke, 1862), 5.
26 Blane estimated that 1 in 3.3 naval men were invalidated in 1782, compared to 1 in 8.9 by 1829. Blane,
op. cit. (note 12), 11–14.
27 Christopher Lloyd and Jack L.S. Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, 1200–1900: Volume IV, 1815–1900
(Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone Ltd, 1963), 3–5.
28 William Burnett, A Practical Account of the Fever Commonly Called the Bilious Remittent (London: J. Callow,
1814).
29 William Burnett, A Practical Account of the Mediterranean Fever (London: J. Callow, 1816), 17.
30 Kevin Brown, Poxed and Scurvied: The Story of Sickness and Health at Sea (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2011),
102–103.
31 Admiralty, The Queen’s Regulations and the Admiralty Instructions for the Government of Her Majesty’s
Naval Service (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1862), 397.
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many surgeons would point to local causes (such as marsh gases), as well as shipboard
conditions, believing ‘a ship may be said to carry at all times within herself the elements of
disease’ (such as foul holds, overcrowding, and dirt).32 These views conformed to earliest
precepts of Lind, Trotter, and Blane, with an emphasis placed on medical topography
and the promotion of cleanliness, dryness, and ventilation as prophylactics. Yet, Burnett’s
statistical approach ensured that naval hygiene would henceforth have a quantitative
basis. This shift was not only characteristic of medicine’s modernisation in the nineteenth
century, but also reflected wider administrative trends, as demographic data was sought to
inform policies across state sectors.33
The pursuit of medical statistics was only one innovation that marked the transition
to the steam age. In the 1840s numerous hygienic texts were published to consolidate
practices as preventive methods were perfected.34 The conventional wisdom of cleaning,
drying, and ventilating a ship as thoroughly as possible became something of an
incantation in this period. For the naval surgeon John Wilson, ‘every thing in the life
of a sailor’ depended on these three measures: ‘his comfort, health, and happiness’. 35
Pointing to numerous instances where diseases had been traced to decomposing organic
matter in the ship’s bowels, Wilson maintained that if everything within an afflicted vessel
was ‘taken out, washed, white-washed, aired, and dried’, the seeds of sickness would be
eradicated.36
The link between organic decay and disease migrated into the steam era, but had been
seen as particularly threatening under sail. This was because the very material from which
such ships were built, wood, was itself an organic substance. Wet, rotting, vegetative matter
was closely associated with tropical diseases, as the scent of putrefaction emanated from
swamp areas ridden with malaria and yellow fever. Unseasoned or ‘green’ wood was
thought to be prone to the same process of putrid decomposition when damp, and its
use in naval construction was frequently blamed for epidemics.37 Indeed, the belief in
constitutionally ‘unhealthy’ ships was associated with the supposedly inherent corruption
of their timbers and planks. Building vessels in absolute dryness with aged or treated
wood became a priority, but even so, crews were constantly at risk when disease could
emanate from the interface of water and wood. Similarly, naval surgeons constantly warned
against the wet washing of wooden decks, seeing cleanliness without dryness as almost
more perilous to health than not cleansing at all.38 Alexander Armstrong, a surgeon who
became Director-General of the Naval Medical Department in 1865, believed there was
‘no more fertile source of disease’ than the ‘constant inhalation of a moist atmosphere’
32 Journal of Surgeon John Jack, HMS Liffey, 1859–60, ADM 101/205, TNA.
33 T. Graham Balfour, ‘Comparative Health of Seamen and Soldiers, as Shown by the Naval and Military
Statistical Reports’, Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 35 (1872), 1–24; William Farr, ‘The Application
of Statistics to Naval and Military Matters’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 3 (1859), 209–24.
34 Robert Armstrong, The Influence of Climate and Other Agents on the Human Constitution, with Reference to
the Causes and Prevention of Disease Among Seamen (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longman, 1843);
F.F. Sankey, Familiar Instructions in Medicine and Surgery with Observations on the Means of Maintaining the
Health of Men on Ship Board (London: Parker, Furnivall, and Parker, 1846); Frederick James Brown, Questions
and Observations in Hygiene (London: John Churchill, 1849).
35 Wilson, op. cit. (note 13), 46.
36 Ibid., 94.
37 For example, Gavin Milroy attributed fever outbreaks aboard the Herald (1856) and Hecate (1858) to wood
rot; Milroy, op. cit. (note 25), 26. See also Alexander Bryson, Report on the Climate and Principal Disease of
the African Station (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1847), p. 229; Wells, op. cit. (note 18), 38.
38 See e.g. Robert Finlayson, An Essay on the Baneful Influence of So Frequently Washing Decks (London:
T. Egerton, 1823).
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from evaporation off the floors.39 His sick list was a litany of scurvy, rheumatism, catarrh,
bronchitis, and other pulmonary and intestinal diseases that he attributed primarily to
damp. Like many hygienists, Armstrong vociferously advocated for the dry rubbing of
the decks with sand to avoid saturation.40
Naval hygiene in the mid-century was thus well attuned to conditions under sail. The
introduction of ironclads, however, promised to transform many of the parameters of its
practice. With metal replacing wood, and engines supplanting sails, maritime medicine
faced new problems and potential solutions, albeit with an unwavering certainty that the
causes of disease would be conquered through a mastery of the environment.
Steam-Powered Hygiene
The transition to steam represented the clearest expression of the Victorian Navy’s modern,
industrial character, as the engines that had powered Britain’s manufacturing revolution
were adapted to ensure its naval supremacy. Following the French use of armoured
steamers in the Crimean War, the British heavily invested in the new crafts promising faster
speed and improved defences.41 The Admiralty’s transition from using wooden sailing
ships to its increased investment in armoured, iron, engine-driven vessels in the mid-
nineteenth century is often recounted through shifts in technology and naval architecture.
Yet, these were also changes that affected life aboard ship. The organisation of naval
medicine, with its emphasis on environmental management, had to take into consideration
the modified design of modern vessels. Equally, the manpower crisis plaguing the Navy
precipitated improvements to seafarers’ welfare in which hygiene was to play a role.42
The mechanisation of ships undoubtedly offered the world’s navies an opportunity to
transform conditions afloat. During the relative peace of the nineteenth century, there
was also a clear willingness amongst the leading naval powers to share their knowledge,
and medical experts from Britain, France, Scandinavia, and the United States read and
disseminated one another’s findings.43 Although all nations faced similar challenges, the
French emerged as the undisputed leaders of naval medicine, with several dedicated
training schools and a research journal established by the mid-century. As Michael A.
Osborne has shown, the French linked naval medicine to their imperial ambitions, and the
field’s prestige attracted ambitious modernisers.44 Certainly Jean-Baptiste Fonssagrives
(1823–1884), who taught naval hygiene at Montpellier, was internationally recognised
as the definitive authority of medicine under steam, and both the British and Americans
frequently deferred to his findings.45 Although British set up medical courses for the Navy
at Netley in 1871 at Haslar in 1881 to train surgeons in the rudiments of naval hygiene,
39 Alexander Armstrong, Observations on Naval Hygiene and Scurvy (London: John Churchill, 1858), 86–7.
40 Bryson, op. cit. (note 37), 221.
41 Peter Padfield, Rule Britannia: The Victorian and Edwardian Navy (London: Routledge, 1981); Eric J. Grove,
The Royal Navy Since 1815: A Short History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
42 Eugene L. Rasor, Reform in the Royal Navy: A Social History of the Lower Deck, 1850–1880 (Hamden:
Archon Books, 1976).
43 Netley professor John D. MacDonald recommended the steam cleaning methods of the Swedish naval
hygienist Abraham Eklund, for example, and Staff Surgeon John Buckley produced a translation of work by
Leroy de Mericourt, Medical Director of the French Navy. See MacDonald, op. cit. (note 14), 116; Leroy de
Mericourt, Modern Naval Hygiene, John Buckley (trans.) (London: Griffin & Co., 1875).
44 Michael A. Osborne, The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press), 111–53.
45 See e.g. Turner, op. cit. (note 15), 194; MacDonald, op. cit. (note 14), 162.
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the discipline was seen as more practical than innovative until its association with tropical
medicine at the close of the century. In the United States, meanwhile, there was a sense
of frustration with the slow progress made by naval medicine as a serious discipline,
and the American naval medical inspector Albert Gihon complained that surgeons rarely
enjoyed the respect and authority of their European counterparts.46 Despite their particular
admiration for French naval medicine, the British were determined to build on their own
traditions of hygiene and discipline to make the most of the transition to steam.
The effective administration of naval medicine necessitated a close adaptation of
preventive measures to conditions afloat. For John D. MacDonald (1826–1908), Professor
of Naval Hygiene at Netley, medical officers required ‘a competent knowledge of the
structure and internal economy of [the] ships’ in which they served.47 It also meant that
ironclads, with their structural differences to wooden ships, mandated a new approach
to naval hygiene. At sea, however, the traditional emphasis on dryness, cleanliness,
and proper ventilation remained constant. During the transition from sail to steam, the
Admiralty’s medical instructions never wavered on these points.48 However, steamers
offered new opportunities for attaining these ideals. This section explores how the
technological advances offered by steam were employed in the service of hygiene, and
how surgeons confronted the material challenges posed by the new vessels.
The problem of ventilating the areas below decks had preoccupied the earliest writers
on maritime medicine, and was seen as no less important in the age of steam.49 This
was not only a matter of providing a breathable atmosphere in enclosed areas, but was
also explicitly directed at clearing away the ‘impure’ air that was blamed for many
illnesses. Effective ventilation thus entailed two processes: clean air had to be drawn in,
and vitiated air circulated out. If either element was flawed, the consequences could be
deadly. In 1846, thirteen passengers were suffocated on the transport vessel Maria Somes,
and two years later a similar fate befell seventy-three immigrants aboard the Londonderry
when its captain battened down the hatches during a storm.50 Such tragedies precipitated
investigations into respiration and circulation requirements.
To evade the threat of suffocation, the minimum amount of space that could be allotted
to each passenger needed to be specified. To this end, surgeons sent detailed measurements
of their ships to the Medical Department for consideration.51 However, it was suggested
that the cubic footage per head was ultimately less important than ensuring a constant
supply of air. According to one authority, it was theoretically possible to ‘live and breathe
healthfully in a box no larger than a coffin’ provided ‘a gentle stream of air were kept
constantly passing through it’.52 The focus therefore turned to the hourly requirement of
air, a calculation that proved contentious. When a former captain, George S. MacIlwaine,
summarised the evidence in 1893, he cited experts whose estimates ranged anywhere
between 150 to 3000 cubic feet.53 Using the work of renowned physiologist Michael
46 Albert L. Gihon, Practical Suggestions in Naval Hygiene (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1873), 2.
47 MacDonald, op. cit. (note 14), 9.
48 Admiralty, op. cit. (note 31), 389.
49 Arnold Zuckerman, ‘Disease and Ventilation in the Royal Navy: The Woodenship Years’, Eighteenth-Century
Life, 11 (1987), 77–89.
50 The Times (Friday, 8 December 1848), 4.
51 Journal of Surgeon John Buckley, HMS Rinaldo, 1870, ADM 101/182, TNA.
52 Henry Edmonds, ‘Ventilation of Iron-Clad Ships of War’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 9
(1866), 313.
53 George S. MacIlwaine, ‘Ventilation of Ships’, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 35 (1893),
2–3.
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Foster, which included the chemical constitution of expired air, MacIlwaine proposed an
hourly rate of 3705 ft3, which was countered by engineers who argued for a far lower
figure.54
While the sums were up for debate, most commentators agreed that steamships had a
greater capacity for ventilation than sailing vessels. This was not due to the actual design of
the newer ships, which had far fewer natural openings than their wooden counterparts.55
Their considerable advantage was in being able to power artificial ventilation systems.
Before the use of engines, only ‘natural’ methods of ventilation could be used – typically
involving various combinations of scuttles, hatches, shafts, and cowls, with wind-sails
angled against their openings to imperfectly direct air below decks. While a variety of
manual fans and bellows had been trialled on wooden vessels, these had been inefficient,
labour-intensive devices.56 The engines of steamships, on the other hand, could easily drive
mechanical fans. Notwithstanding their utility, there was much debate over where the fans
should be positioned and whether they should be used primarily for supply or extraction.57
Steamships had an additional advantage for producing the currents necessary for
ventilation: heat. Applying the principle that hot air rises, steam from the boilers could
be redirected throughout the ship to create natural draughts. Supply inlets were added to
areas below decks that were linked to heated airshafts, and steam-jet ventilators allowed
for a more targeted approach. The noise and engine-dependence of such methods could
prove problematic, however.58 With so many different areas needing to be ventilated,
naval vessels were ultimately fitted with multiple systems that combined both natural
and artificial means of supplying air: steam and hand-driven fans were joined by
traditional scuttles, pipes, and cowls.59 There was little uniformity to these arrangements;
the Admiralty’s willingness to trial new schemes meant that numerous methods were
concurrently in use in the late nineteenth century. MacDonald’s 1881 textbook on naval
hygiene described dozens of ventilation of apparatuses over some hundred pages – a focus
justified by the view that fresh air was the ‘best disinfectant’.60
The subject of ventilation was also ripe for the scientific thrust of Victorian naval
medicine, which employed quantitative analyses of air composition, respiration rates, and
ventilators’ capacity to judge competing systems. These studies combined advances in
chemistry, physiology, and physics, and showed how complementary concepts in medicine
and engineering could improve naval efficiency. It also demonstrated how civilian and
military concerns could overlap, with cowl ventilation tests run by the Sanitary Institute
in 1878, for example, becoming a focus of naval interest.61 Although the link between
impure air and disease undoubtedly warranted surgeons’ keen attention to ventilation, it is
54 Ibid., 12.
55 MacDonald, op. cit. (note 14), 70.
56 Ibid., 77–86.
57 Se e.g. John D. MacDonald, ‘On Ship Ventilation as a Development of Naval Hygiene’, Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution 39 (1895), 721–732; and ‘On the Ventilation of Ships’, Journal of the Royal United
Service Institution 18 (1875), 136–51.
58 R.W. Coppinger, ‘Sanitation Afloat’, in C. E. Shelley (ed.), Transactions of the Seventh International
Congress of Hygiene and Demography. Volume III. Section VIII: Naval and Military Hygiene (London: Eyre
and Spottiswoode, 1892), 28.
59 See John Taylor’s description of ventilation aboard the Sappho and Scylla in MacIlwaine, op. cit. (note 53),
15.
60 MacDonald, op. cit. (note 14), 50.
61 The privately-financed cowl tests were subsequently challenged, although they were cited by naval hygienists.
P. F. Nursey, The Kew Cowl Tests (London: Hickson, Ward and Co., 1902).
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nonetheless striking that medical officers such as Henry Edmonds mastered the technical
skills necessary to modify their ships’ systems to promote better airflow, or that they were
given the leeway to do so.62 This was possibly because naval architects tended to treat
ventilation as an afterthought, laying pipes in odd places, or creating channels between the
cabins and bilges that emitted ‘highly objectionable perfumes’.63 Medical officers had little
choice but to make the best of such arrangements. At the Haslar Naval Medical School,
set up in 1881, ventilation was taught at the neighbouring Portsmouth dockyards so that
surgeons could understand the inner workings of circulation systems under construction.64
Steamships not only had the capacity to produce good air, but also good water. Providing
sufficient potable water for long cruises was a long-standing challenge of maritime
medicine. The traditional solution of storing water in casks carried a risk of contamination
from wood decay, and boiling was recommended to destroy the ‘animalculae’ that bred
within them.65 The introduction of metal tanks in the early nineteenth century was thus
met with enthusiasm, and because the British built them of iron rather than lead, as the
French did, they did not encounter similar problems of lead poisoning.66 Nonetheless,
ships frequently had to stop to refill their limited stores. This was a fraught exercise in
a period where communication with foreign shores, particularly in warm climates, was
seen as a health hazard. Despite the Admiralty’s efforts to map fresh water sources,
surgeons regularly traced outbreaks of stomach and bowel complaints to tainted water
from foreign ports, an association strengthened by the mid-century discovery that cholera
was waterborne.67 By the 1870s, medical officers were supplied with chemical kits to
test the quality of water brought aboard.68 By this stage, however, many relied on their
ships’ capacity to condense water from steam, a process enabled by the introduction of
evaporators and condensers.69 Normandy’s apparatus, patented in 1851, streamlined the
process of distilling, aerating, and cooling potable water from steam generated in the
boilers. With such breakthroughs, naval vessels no longer had to run the risks associated
with making frequent landfall. Although they could never hope to be entirely independent
of outside influences, hygienists increasingly saw their ships as self-contained, floating
fortresses against the sources of disease.
Engine-driven ships still needed to stop and refuel, however. Coaling stations were
rapidly set up to service naval vessels around the globe, and some of the old fears that had
attended water collection transferred to coal. In his 1893 treatise on tropical hygiene, Fleet
surgeon R.W. Coppinger described coal as a potential vector for transmitting the ‘materies
morbi’ of malarial fever to men aboard.70 Drawing on his understanding of chemical
62 Edmonds received permission to implement an exhaust system that expelled spent air via shafts connected to
the steamer’s main funnel. Journal of Surgeon H. Edmonds, HMS St Jean D’Acre, 1859, ADM 101/203, TNA.
63 Journal of Surgeon David Lloyd Morgan, HMS Royal Alfred, 1867, ADM 101/232, TNA.
64 Walter Reid, ‘The Duties of Naval Surgeons’, BMJ (23 March 1889), 645–6.
65 See Vandeburgh, op. cit. (note 21), 29; Wilson, op. cit. (note 13), 41.
66 Mericourt, op. cit. (note 43), v; Chevers, op. cit. (note 1), 4–5; Gihon, op. cit. (note 46), 90.
67 William Saunders, Hygienic, Medical and Surgical Hints for Young Officers in the Royal and of the Merchant
Navy (London: John Churchill, 1856), 18–20.
68 Admiralty, The Queen’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions for the Government of Her Majesty’s Navy
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1879), 333.
69 Wells, op. cit. (note 18), 54.
70 R.W. Coppinger, ‘Tropical naval hygiene’, in Andrew Davidson (ed.), Diseases of Warm Climates (Edinburgh:
Young J. Pentland, 1893), 83. For a discussion of how cargo was perceived as a vector of disease, see David S.
Barnes, ‘Cargo, “Infection”, and the Logic of Quarantine in the Nineteenth Century’, Bulletin of the History of
Medicine, 88 (2014), 91–5.
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reactions, Coppinger also warned that coal could undergo oxidation changes in moist
tropical weather, potentially producing dangerous ‘marsh gases’ and hydrogen sulphide.71
Furthermore, coal was liable to spontaneously combust in the heat, representing a new
danger faced by steamships in the tropics. It was not only coal that posed a threat; the
conductive metal siding of steamers made their interiors intolerably hot and unhealthy
in warm climates.72 The vessels’ improved capacity for ventilation would prove vital in
offsetting such effects, and particularly benefitted the stokers who worked near the blazing
heat of the engines.73
Throughout this period there was continued anxiety about the relationship between
climate and health that prefigured the development of tropical medicine that would recast
these associations in bacteriological terms. Steamships moved more quickly in and out
of warm regions than sailing vessels could, and allowed for less time to physically
‘acclimatise’ to the changes in temperature that were seen as a precipitating cause of
disease.74 Instead, superficial adjustments to clothing and diet were recommended in
tropical areas, and exertion was to be avoided during the hottest parts of the day.75 It was
thus something of an advantage that steamships required less manual labour to operate
than sailing vessels.
For naval hygienists, the transition to steam thus offered both new opportunities and
challenges for maritime health. Despite the passage of time and a complete transformation
of the shipboard environment, the preventive strategy prevailed. Nowhere was this more
apparent than in the paradoxical quest for dryness at sea. The hygienic fight against
moisture and humidity was far more difficult to wage at sea than on land, with ships
described as houses ‘immersed in water’ and exposed to the elements.76 Damp was
perceived as a distinct health hazard: at best, it exacerbated pulmonary conditions such
as catarrh, rheumatism, and bronchitis; at worst, it triggered the rot and decay at the
heart of lethal fevers. Miasmas fostered in moist holds and bilges were frequently held
responsible for diseases ranging from yellow fever to tuberculosis.77 The French hygienist
Jean-Baptiste Fonssagrives may have coined the popular aphorism ‘a damp ship is an
unhealthy ship’, but he never downplayed the difficulties of ridding a ship of moisture.
Indeed, he argued that metal ships were harder to dry than wooden ones, and his American
counterpart, Albert Gihon, observed that ‘watery vapour’ remained a scourge of maritime
sanitation late into the century.78
Given the fears over organic decomposition in wooden ships, steamers ought to have
carried less risk of damp-related diseases. Yet, the steel and iron sides of the new
vessels could become coated with condensation during temperature changes, leading to
the phenomenon of ‘sweating’ walls. One naval surgeon recalled an engineering officer
who could ‘scrape up water from the sides of his cabin with the hollow of his hand’,
71 Coppinger, ibid., 83.
72 Joseph Wilson, Naval Hygiene (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870), 19–20.
73 For a discussion of stokers’ health as it related to high temperature exposure, see Turner, op. cit. (note 15),
188–92.
74 Armstrong, op. cit. (note 34), 27–32.
75 James Bird, ‘The Means of Practically Applying the Principles of Medical Geography, for the Preservation of
the Health of Soldiers and Seamen in Foreign Climates’, Journal of the United Service Institution, 1 (1 January
1858), 223–34.
76 Coppinger, op. cit. (note 70), 81.
77 Bird, op. cit. (note 75), 223, 234.
78 Jean-Baptiste Fonssagrives, Traite´ d’hygie`ne navale (Paris: J.B. Baillie`re, 1856), 261; Albert L. Gihon, ‘The
Need for Sanitary Reform in Ship-Life’, Public Health Papers and Reports, 3 (1876), 89.
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with ‘water running down and wetting everything’.79 In merchant vessels, this problem
dismayed medical inspectors, who observed that sailors’ bunks and bedding were often
wet through as a result of poor environmental management.80 When a sanitary commission
investigated merchant ships in 1890, they found rheumatic sailors ‘sweltering in the heat
of the overcrowded, badly ventilated cabin’, with exposed limbs resting against the cold,
wet, iron sides of the ships.81 On naval vessels, the Admiralty tried sheathing the decks
with non-conductive lining, and trialled substances such as cork, tiles, and cement around
the bunks. London’s Port Medical Inspector, William Collingridge, advocated for similar
measures aboard merchant ships, where there were fewer provisions made for sailors’
health.82 When it came to instituting medical reforms, the civilian and commercial spheres
generally followed the Navy’s lead.
The other major problem of moisture – that of foul water accumulating in the bilges –
remained intractable in the steam age. The lowest recesses of vessels invariably filled with
the runoff from every deck, creating noxious cesspools whose disease-causing properties
were likened to ‘a flame in a thatch cottage’.83 Keeping the bilges dry was therefore a
priority, and allegedly ‘tenfold more important’ on steamers than on wooden ships.84
On such vessels, woodchips from the stores wound their way to the ship’s bottom and
mixed with coal dust and other organic impurities that ostensibly emitted poisonous ‘marsh
gases’ as they decayed. Equally, when seawater and slop water containing such putrescible
matter pooled together, traces of iron sulphide, present in the metal framing and plating,
interacted with the organic waste to produce toxic gases. While the deadly emissions were
initially linked to miasmatic theory, chemical analysis at the close of the nineteenth century
identified the mix as hydrogen sulphide, a foul-smelling compound several times more
lethal to inhale than carbon monoxide.85
Pumping and drying out the bilges was thus seen as a vital matter throughout the
steam age. No less important was the routine cleaning of the ship from top to bottom.
Indeed, cleanliness was the absolute priority of maritime medicine in the nineteenth
century – the sine qua non without which sailors’ health was sure to suffer. This belief
presupposed the link between dirt and disease, which equally propelled the public health
movement in Britain. On land, the focus was on removing nuisances, creating sewers, and
whitewashing residences. The Royal Navy had long anticipated these concerns, and had
instituted washings and sanitary inspections following the recommendations of Trotter
and Blane. Its celebrated reputation for cleanliness was only enhanced by technological
innovations following the transition to steam.
The presence of the boilers particularly benefitted personal hygiene. A constant supply
of hot water meant that men could look forward to cleanliness as a ‘duty as well as a
pleasure’, with a weekly warm wash with soap.86 The notion that keeping clean was a
‘duty’ reflected the notion that all seafarers were partially responsible for their own health
79 Edmonds, op. cit. (note 52), 326.
80 Collingridge, op. cit. (note 18), 182–3; Henry E. Armstrong, ‘The Hygiene of Merchant Ships, with Especial
Regard to Seamen’, Public Health, 7 (1894), 64.
81 Lancet Special Sanitary Commission, ‘Report on Sanitation at Sea’, The Lancet (20 September 1890), 635.
82 William Collingridge, ‘Practical Points in the Hygiene of Ships and Quarantine’, The Lancet (5 May 1894),
1111.
83 Chevers, op. cit. (note 1), 23.
84 Turner, op. cit. (note 15), 180.
85 Ibid., 181; MacDonald, op. cit. (note 14), 245; Coppinger, op. cit. (note 70), 82.
86 Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy, for the year 1864 (London: House of Commons, 1867), 18. See
also Brown, op. cit. (note 34), 24.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2018.3
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 137.205.202.105, on 16 May 2018 at 11:35:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
190 Elise Juzda Smith
– and those of their shipmates – through sanitary precautions. The same logic underlay
the requisite cleaning of dirty clothing and bedding, which evoked similar hygienic
scrutiny given their association with skin complaints ranging from herpes to eczema and
ulcers.87 Steamers could also breed their own dirt. Machinery affixed to the engine room
floors meant ‘accumulations of dirt and other offensive rubbish’ collected beneath them,
contaminating the air with unhealthy emissions.88 The ‘filth’ of oil and coal dust were
also a hazard faced by engineers and stokers, and yellow fever was even attributed to the
‘pools of mud, formed and grease and dirt’ around the engines, which ostensibly emitted
foul gases in warm climates.89 Chloride of zinc was liberally used to neutralise this oily,
organic waste.90
The Navy’s emphasis on cleanliness was not only a medical concern, but reflected the
broader gentrification of the Victorian sea service. Recruitment shortages spurred efforts to
attract more sailors, and conditions and pay improved as a consequence. Maintaining dry,
clean, and comfortable vessels formed part of efforts to raise the Navy’s reputation, and
spotless decks and personal presentation now appeared as a visible symbol of enhanced
naval discipline. Its dedication to cleanliness was consequently pursued for both medical
and moral reasons. New technologies helped to maintain the highest sanitary standards.
Superheated steam from the exhaust system could be conveyed throughout the ship and
used as a powerful disinfectant – a method particularly useful for clearing the filthy
forecastles of merchant ships of vermin and cockroaches.91 The steam cleaning of clothing
and bedding at ports also become a favoured alternative to quarantine, demonstrating the
spread of modern methods for checking disease.92 As the use of chemical cleansers became
ubiquitous at the close of the century, vast quantities of chloride-based disinfectants began
to be sprayed throughout newly arrived vessels to ensure their purity.
In fact, chemicals had been used aboard naval ships throughout the transition from sail to
steam. Chlorine solutions were poured into bilge water to destroy organic matter, nitrogen
dioxide – a strong oxidant – was considered best for yellow fever outbreaks, and bleaches
such chloride of lime were dissolved into the air to sanitise the atmosphere. Alternatively,
a liberal application of quicklime or Condy’s fluid (potassium permanganate) was used
as an all-purpose disinfectant.93 The rapidly expanding chemical industry showed the
potential for modern, scientific approaches to hygiene, and was enthusiastically embraced
by the Navy. Indeed, chemical cleaners became particularly prevalent after the rise of germ
theory, but even for more traditional hygienists, a sprinkling of quicklime or chloric acid
could mitigate the effects of contingent contagion by ‘sweetening the air’.94 If anything,
surgeons became worried that an over-reliance on disinfectants would mask the smell of
decay.95
Many of the developments of naval hygiene in the steam age ultimately involved a
straightforward adaptation of new solutions to old problems, reinforcing long-established
87 Wilson, op. cit. (note 13), 35; Wells, op. cit. (note 18), 61.
88 Milroy, op. cit. (note 25), 31–2.
89 Wells, op. cit. (note 18), 39; Wilson, op. cit. (note 72), 12, 175.
90 See e.g. Saunders, op. cit. (note 67), 18; Wells, op. cit. (note 18), 40.
91 Archibald Finlay, The Seaman’s Medical Guide, 2nd edn (London: George Philip & Son, 1891), 24.
92 Frederick Montizambert, ‘Modern quarantine in Canada and the United States’, in C.E. Shelley (ed.), op. cit.
(note 58), 11–12.
93 See e.g. Turner, op. cit. (note 15), 200; MacDonald, op. cit. (note 14), 248–51.
94 Finlay, op. cit. (note 91), 23.
95 Journal of Staff Surgeon Thomas Browne, HMS Griffon, 1878, ADM 101/235, TNA.
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tropes. Yet, the foundations of naval medicine were not completely static during this
period. The relationship between theory and practice forms is examined in the next section,
showing how naval surgeons aligned themselves in contemporary debates over the origin
and spread of disease.
Causes and Consequences
Maritime medical texts stressed that ships’ surgeons were in a privileged position to
study disease. As they traversed the world, medical officers encountered a wide variety
of ailments, and were able to monitor their progress amongst a fixed population in a
controlled environment. The Naval Medical Department sought to exploit this unique
vantage point by requiring surgeons to keep journals recounting their ships’ medical
history and listing every sickness they treated. They were explicitly asked to engage
in contemporary debates over the nature of infectious diseases, and to weigh the
influence of geography, climate, and human contact as causal agents. This was not
meant to be an exercise in idle speculation. According to the scientific spirit of the
age, surgeons were expected to record all the atmospheric measurements that might
have a bearing on health, and to faithfully monitor every stage of sickness. Armed
with increasingly precise meteorological instruments, chemical tests, and statistical
methods, medical officers refined naval hygiene for the modern era. Yet, when it
came to accounting for the cause of disease, consensus eluded them. Many of the
adaptations of steam technology to medical concerns rested on long-standing assumptions
about the environmental origins of shipboard epidemics. Increasingly, however, surgeons
found these explanations insufficient, pointing to incidences of disease on vessels that
were perfectly ‘sweet and clean’. While bacteriological theories offered an alternative
etiological model by the century’s close, the sanitary principles underpinning maritime
medicine continued to hold sway. Bolstered by evidence that the Navy’s hygienic efforts
yielded better health outcomes than those experienced by the less-disciplined Merchant
service, cleanliness retained its pre-eminent status across the medical spectrum.
As has been shown, naval medicine emphasised the need for dryness, ventilation, and
cleanliness as panaceas against the presumed causes of disease: organic decay and impure
air, exacerbated by humidity. Such causes could be endemic to particular regions, or to a
ship itself, if the conditions aboard were foetid enough. While factors such as diet emerged
as important contributors to sea diseases such as scurvy, air quality was still emphasised
in Lind’s account of successfully trialling citrus juice.96 Avoiding tropical ports, purifying
the air, cleaning the bilges, and drying the decks thus represented a comprehensive strategy
for counteracting the chief agents of illness.
Increasingly, specific disease categorisation in the nineteenth century brought more
precise attributions of cause: some, such as alcoholism, were linked to vice, while others –
particularly respiratory disorders – came from exposure to the cold and damp. Temperance,
dietary moderation, and proper clothing were recommended as practical precautions
against such maladies. The broad category of fevers and other infectious diseases evaded
such straightforward attributions, however: they struck individuals regardless of their
habits or station, often afflicted those who spent a night ashore, but also attacked those
who never left the ship. It is attempts to account for these diseases that form the focus of
the remainder of this article.
96 James Lind, A Treatise on Scurvy in Three Parts (Edinburgh: Sands, Murray and Cochrane, 1753), 97.
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The Royal Navy was particularly embroiled in etiological debates because ships had
long been recognised as vectors of disease. The rationale of maritime quarantine was
the presumed contagiousness of certain illnesses, and the practice of impounding sickly
ships was periodically enforced in Britain from the seventeenth century onwards.97 By
the late eighteenth century, however, opponents to quarantine convincingly argued that the
supposedly contagious diseases – yellow fever and plague – had not been imported despite
decades of commerce with afflicted regions. The idea that such diseases were limited to
certain places, arising from local miasmas, was pitted against the theory that people or
goods acted as agents of transmission. For those objecting to it, quarantine was not only
medically unnecessary, but also politically oppressive and detrimental to trade.98 Opinion
particularly wavered over the communicability of yellow fever, dividing those who blamed
foreign importation from those who held local insanitary conditions accountable.
The Navy’s position on quarantine and contagion was far from fixed in the Victorian
period, and the Admiralty recommended that both sanitary measures and isolation be
instituted at the first signs of sickness.99 Successive medical directors held considerably
different positions on the issue in the nineteenth century, and their views could never hope
to influence medical officers posted far from Britain. Accordingly, attitudes amongst naval
medical personnel varied in their journals and published accounts of epidemics. What is
clear is that the transition to steamers, and the continued emphasis placed on hygiene, did
not forestall instances of shipboard diseases.
The fate of the steam-sloop HMS Eclair in 1845 became a particular point of contention
when two-thirds of its crew died of a presumed yellow fever outbreak on return from
the African station. Mark Harrison has described how this disaster figured in debates
over contagionism and quarantine, as several crew members died in isolation following
the ship’s arrival in Britain.100 Official inquiries added little clarity, with investigators
reaching different conclusions about whether or not the Eclair was carrying yellow fever,
and whether it was contagious. The alternative explanation assigned the virulence of the
fever to the insanitary conditions aboard the vessel – a position reluctantly endorsed
by the Navy’s Medical Director William Burnett. Although the Admiralty significantly
improved ventilation systems on ironclads during this period in response, speculation over
the Eclair’s high mortality continued.
Almost all Victorian naval hygienists scoured the Eclair case for evidence supporting
their preferred understanding of fevers. However, writings by and for naval surgeons
were less concerned with the merits of quarantine than on strategies to evade disease
altogether. Former surgeon John Wilson drew from his encounters with African marsh
fever to deny its contagiousness, instead insisting that the ‘virus or miasm’ behind the
Eclair’s fever outbreak ‘was formed and radiated in the ship [. . . ] in the limbers, or
other parts concealed – the issue of decomposition and emanation, or heat, matter, and
moisture’.101 Rather than imposing pointless quarantines, ‘cleaning and clearing’ was the
only possible defence.102 The notion that the Eclair’s fever was generated in its filthy
97 John Booker, Maritime Quarantine: The British Experience, c. 1650–1900 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
98 Mark Harrison, Disease and the Modern World: 1500 to the Present Day (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 97–105.
99 Admiralty, Regulations and Instructions for the Medical Officers of His Majesty’s Fleet (London: W. Clowes
and Sons, 1835), 24.
100 Mark Harrison, Contagion: How Commerce has Spread Disease (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012),
80–106.
101 Wilson, op. cit. (note 13), 82.
102 Ibid., 91.
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recesses gained a following amongst those who saw the entire justification for maritime
sanitation embodied in the disaster.103 By contrast, Alexander Bryson made a lengthy
study of African diseases in 1847, and concluded that the ill-fated crew had contracted
the fever from malarious emanations issuing from the banks of the Sherbro River in
Sierra Leone.104 Contrarily, Gavin Milroy, a medical inspector and editor of the Medico-
Chirurchical Review, confidently declaimed the Eclair’s innate sickliness owing to poor
ventilation and ‘other causes of insalubrity’.105 A committed sanitarian, he downplayed
the extent of medical disagreement by stating that ‘no one can well doubt the cause’ of
‘the exceeding and persistent unhealthiness of such ships as [. . . ] the Eclair’.106 Although
the vessel was renamed in 1846, it retained a reputation for disease, showing that the trope
of constitutionally unhealthy ships transferred to the steam age – with faulty ventilation
taking the place of rotted timbers as a fundamental flaw.
Arguments over the Eclair thus became a proxy for wider debates within the medical
community about how local conditions related to the propagation of disease. There
was little argument that certain localities were unhealthy, with tropical areas seen as
particularly lethal.107 Yet, it was not entirely clear whether the conditions that caused
fevers in such areas could be replicated in the hold of a ship to produce similar diseases.
While sailing vessels could potentially generate marsh-like gases in their moist, wooden
interiors, steamers defied such easy comparisons. Equally, while filth and decay were still
cited as the primary culprits of disease in the steam age, ships’ surgeons often struggled
to reconcile sanitarian ideas with their own observations. Their journals state that fevers
struck despite their surroundings being ‘very clean and dry’ from daily scrubbing and
scraping, or with ‘holds, bilges and every part of the ship as dry and sweet as it is possible
to keep them’.108 In these cases, external causes, such as contact with pestilential ports or
over indulgence, had to be identified. Even in an enclosed naval vessel, there were still
myriad possible causal agents. Maintaining a salubrious environment may still have been
considered necessary for evading disease, but it was by no means sufficient.
The attribution of filth as a causal factor came under attack during Alexander Bryson’s
directorship of the Naval Medical Department from 1864 to 1869. Under his watch, the
annual compiling of surgeons’ journals into the service’s official health report became an
exercise in editorialising about the ‘true’ causes of epidemics. Bryson had complained
that the Navy’s data collection efforts were insufficient as early as 1856, when he edited
his first report. The requirement that surgeons describe meteorological and hygienic
conditions when epidemics struck, he wrote, unfairly favoured environmental explanations
of disease. Instead, surgeons should ‘distinctly state whether the persons first attacked
had or had not been exposed to infection or contagion, or whether they had or had
not visited any port, place or ship’ in the weeks preceding an outbreak.109 Bryson’s
103 See e.g. Edmonds, op. cit. (note 52), 319; Gihon, op. cit. (note 46), 113.
104 Bryson, op. cit. (note 37), 179–94.
105 Milroy, op. cit. (note 25), 19.
106 Ibid., 53.
107 On the geography of disease and theories of acclimatisation, see e.g. Philip D. Curtin, ‘The White Man’s
Grave: Image and Reality, 1750–1850’, Journal of British Studies, 1 (1961), 94–110; David Livingstone, ‘Human
Acclimatisation: Perspectives on a Contested Field of Inquiry in Science, Medicine, and Geography’, History of
Science, 25 (1987), 359–94.
108 Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy, For the Year 1861 (London: House of Commons, 1864), 63;
Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy, For the Year 1862 (London: House of Commons, 1865), 3.
109 Statistical Report of the Health of the Royal Navy, For the Year 1856 (London: House of Commons, 1858),
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commitment to contagionism principally related to two diseases: yellow fever and cholera,
which he insisted were not spontaneously generated aboard ship. In subsequent years
he constantly returned to this theme, warning against contact with both diseases, and
contradicting surgeons who believed they originated in foul bilges. In the Report for
1858, Bryson explained how the HMS Icarus had communicated yellow fever from Belize
to Jamaica, carrying the disease from an infected region to a healthy one.110 In 1861,
he critiqued surgeons who claimed that yellow fever and cholera stemmed from bilgy
holds, leading to futile cleaning efforts.111 Once Bryson became Director-General of the
Medical Department, his colleague Alexander Mackay continued to edit the Reports from
a contagionist perspective, correcting surgeons who blamed yellow fever on atmospheric
conditions and ascribing outbreaks to contact with the disease ashore instead.112 In one
case, Mackay dismissed the ‘absolutely worthless’ observations that had been supplied, the
result of ‘fanciful’ sanitarian theories that blamed ‘accumulations of every abomination,
defective drainage, crowding, squalor and poverty, heat and humidity’ for yellow fever
whether such conditions were present or not.113 Every case of yellow fever, he countered,
could be traced to contact with a sick individual.
Bryson espoused an altogether more scientific approach to naval medicine. Central to
this vision was the collection of data, which he described in his essay on ‘Medicine and
Medical Statistics’ for the Navy’s 1849 Manual of Scientific Enquiry.114 The Navy’s new
scientific spirit was exemplified by this volume’s emphasis on methodical observation
across disciplines. As Michael S. Reidy has argued, Naval authorities in this period actively
solicited scientific expertise to overcome long-standing navigational, oceanographic, and
meteorological problems.115 In particular, Humboltian scientific methodology, such as the
mapping of natural phenomena and the collection of quantitative data, were embraced
to ensure Britain ‘ruled the waves’. For Bryson, this meant that surgeons could use
hygrometric and thermometric instruments to chart atmospheric conditions on health, and
measure pulse and respiration rates in different climates. In places associated with disease,
topographical notes would uncover sources of ‘noxious effluvia’.116 Equally, by comparing
the ship’s movements and outbreaks of disease, one might determine ‘to an hour [. . . ] the
exact period of incubation in certain endemic and contagious diseases’.117 For Bryson,
scientific methods and instruments would help isolate the sources of disease, separating
those that were local or constitutional from ones that were clearly contagious. While the
optimism of sanitarians stemmed from their belief that a perfectly clean ship would be
perfectly healthy, for Bryson the real possibility of reducing mortality from infectious
diseases would come from studying their methods of transmission.118
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Bryson put his ideas into practice as the Navy’s Medical Director. The aforementioned
Reports became more quantitative, with detailed mortality and morbidity tables provided
to enable comparative, geographic analysis.119 The annual publication of these statistics
allowed health reformers to trace improvements over time, as rates of sickness were
mapped out in recurring categories each year. When T. Graham Balfour analysed the
medical returns of the Army and Navy in 1872, he confidently demonstrated the ‘marked
reduction’ in naval deaths in the 1860s compared to the 1830s, which had dropped from an
average of 8.8 to 6.35 per 1000.120 Balfour also suggested that the very act of publishing
medical data had spurred sanitary reforms, which were more aggressively pursued in the
years following the issuing of the first Report in the late 1830s.121 The dawn of the steam
age clearly coincided with a new era of scientific investigation and analysis that ensured
higher standards of health aboard the new ironclads.
In fact, the Eclair episode had demonstrated that steamers still experienced dramatic
outbreaks of disease, and there was evidence suggesting that fevers were particularly
virulent on the new ships. It was suggested that the engines exacerbated overcrowding
and reduced air quality, given the disproportionate amount of space they occupied below
decks.122 Further, their heat was thought to generate a harmful quasi-tropical ambiance
that promoted the spread of zymotic diseases. As vessels increased in size and ventilation
methods improved, steamers were progressively considered more conducive to health.
In other regards, the steam era heralded unequivocal medical advantages. Engine-driven
ships were faster than wooden ones, leading to fewer nutritional deficiencies and a
more rapid transfer of the sick to hospitals.123 It also meant that there was less time to
acclimatise to changes in heat and humidity, a concern as such transitions were seen as
constitutionally damaging.124 In compensation, however, quitting unhealthy localities was
quickly accomplished when needed – an important provision for those who believed that
malaria and cholera were endemic to tropical regions.
If an evidence-based approach indicated that naval health was gradually improving, it
did little to resolve debates around disease causation. In 1841, the statistician A.M. Tulloch
was surprised to learn that there were comparatively few cases of fever in South
America despite the prevalence of warm, wet, marshy conditions.125 He hoped that the
Navy’s medical data would help to dispel false theories linking diseases to particular
environments, instead offering insight into the ‘specific agencies to which the absence or
presence of particular diseases is attributable’.126 Far from reassuring commentators that
their particular etiological theory was correct, data collection often raised more questions
than it answered. When Robert Armstrong, a deputy inspector of the fleet, examined the
Navy’s reports in 1843, he too noted that the presence of swamps had little correlation
with outbreaks of disease.127 He conducted his own chemical tests on the air, water, and
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soil in the Dutch East Indies for signs of the ‘Batavian fever’ then raging, and found no
evidence of noxious gas. With scant evidence for the theory of ‘marsh miasmas’ caused
by ‘vegeto-animal’ poisons, Armstrong suggested that medical officers’ unfounded beliefs
blinded them to alternative explanations for disease, such as the ‘electrical condition’ of
the air.128
Certainly, naval hygiene texts had always been ambivalent about the causes of common
sea diseases. Lind had seen scurvy as a problem of both diet and air quality, and a century
later it was still associated with both causes, with cold and damp added as aggravating
factors.129 When the Admiralty appointed a committee to investigate the severe outbreak
of scurvy that had hampered its 1875 arctic expedition, its detailed final report attributed
the initial outbreak to the ‘absence of lime juice’ amongst the sledding parties, but also
implicated the ‘comparatively vitiated’ atmosphere of the lower decks, as well as the damp
and extreme temperature changes.130 The state of medical uncertainty in this era invariably
led to such oscillations. On its own, nutrition gained some recognition as an important
factor in seafarers’ wellbeing, with the Medical Department acknowledging in the Health
Report for 1867 that ‘without a proper diet’, cleanliness, dryness, and ventilation would
‘prove unavailing to preserve health and prevent disease’.131 While dietary adjustments
were made in 1859, 1861, and 1879 to align the caloric intake of sailors with their
workload (with stokers given extra rum and sugar), the actual benefits of these changes
continued to be conflated with other preventive measures.132 Rather than supplant old
ideas, new theories came to coexist alongside them: on one page it was possible to see
cholera attributed to contaminated water, on another to dietary excesses.133 Likewise, it
was possible to find medical authorities claiming that cool air draughts were both beneficial
and detrimental to health.134 Naval hygiene was rarely presented as a systematic science,
but as a series of recommendations based on practice and observation. If one measure did
not work; another could always be tried. Despite the haphazardness of this approach, it
allowed for a more holistic approach to health, with personal habits, the atmosphere, and
sanitation all requiring consideration.
Notwithstanding the flexibility of hygienic recommendations, ventilation and sanitation
were still the favoured methods of preserving health. The link between cleanliness and
wellness was particularly intractable because dirt and disease were so visibly linked in the
nineteenth century. Medical authorities frequently ascribed the Navy’s unhealthy past to
the grime and squalor that had prevailed before the mid-eighteenth century. With a rigorous
emphasis on dryness, cleanliness, and ventilation, steamships were deemed two to three
times more efficient than sailing vessels.135 Moreover, the Navy could always favourably
compare itself to the Merchant service: although morbidity rates were not tallied for the
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latter, mortality rates were almost twice as high by 1899 (9.6 per 1000 compared to the
Navy’s 4.9).136 Given the poor sanitary conditions aboard merchant vessels, it was widely
assumed that the Navy’s success at environmental management had optimised the health
of its crews.137 Certainly the Medical Department endorsed this view, as the Director-
Generals of the late-Victorian era credited the steady decline in deaths from disease almost
entirely to ‘the success of sanitary efforts’.138
Conclusion
From its inception in the eighteenth century, until the close of the nineteenth century,
cleanliness, dryness, and ventilation reigned as the holy trinity of naval hygiene.
Improvements in sailors’ health during this period were continuously ascribed to these
factors. When Walter Reid addressed surgeons at the Naval Medical School in 1889, he
stressed that the safety of the British Empire depended on their ability to maintain the lives
of British seamen.139 Nothing was more crucial to this objective than preventive medicine.
By this stage, the conversion to steam had been fully effected and the great Majestic class
of pre-Dreadnoughts was replacing the older ironclads. No expense was spared in the
building of these elaborate vessels, and their design incorporated all the hygienic advances
of the steam era, from artificial ventilation systems, to water condensers, to washing
machines to facilitate the cleaning of clothes and bedding. As steamship design came to
be standardised, hygienic principles were incorporated into naval architecture. Medical
officers also came to enjoy a medical education tailored to the designs of these ships.
Naval surgeons were also increasingly trained in the laboratory. As bacteriology gained
acceptance, it proved particularly instrumental to the development of tropical medicine
– a specialism long associated with the Navy as ‘diseases of warm climates’ were an
occupational hazard of seafarers. It is no coincidence that Patrick Manson, the ‘father of
tropical medicine’, worked at various Seamen’s Hospitals in London while shaping ideas
about parasitology and the spread of malaria.140 Naval medicine was thus well situated to
embrace germ theory, which offered a clear explanation for why cleaning and ventilating
had been comparatively effective at minimising sickness at sea.
For naval hygienists, germ theory may not have appeared particularly revolutionary. The
idea that organic impurities spread disease was reasonably widespread in the Victorian
period, and microbes could be easily substituted for the nebulous ‘poisonous matter’ that
had been traditionally blamed for shipboard epidemics. For John McDonald, the notion
of airborne bacteria merely justified the need to perfect ventilation, adding a new twist to
an old, established principle.141 Efforts at limiting the spread of recognised vectors, such
as mosquitos, further enhance the effectiveness of hygienic arrangements in later years.
Ships’ surgeons simply had to reframe old practices within a new framework that still
prioritised prevention.
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Although Victorian hygienists debated the contagiousness of certain diseases and how
to evade them, nineteenth-century naval medicine did not significantly depart from its
founding precepts. Instead of using their contained environment to test etiological theories,
surgeons were persuaded to perfect hygiene practices instead. This emphasis contributed
to naval discipline and order, allotting surgeons a role in regulating life afloat. Yet while
hygienic principles did not radically shift during the transition from sail to steam, new
technologies were still harnessed to improve medical efficiency. The process of adapting
engine-driven ships to serve the welfare of seafarers showed the positive effects of
investing in health – not in the complete eradication of disease, but in the improved
capacity to evade its probable causes.
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